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Comments
State Campaign Finance Law:
An Overview and a
Call for Reform
Corrupt influence, which is itself the perennial spring of all prodigality, and
of all disorder; which loads us, more than millions in debt; which takes
away vigour from our arms, wisdom from our councils, and every shadow
of authority and credit from the most venerable parts of our constitution.
- Edmund Burke., Speech on Economic Reform, 1780
In the General Election of 1988, only 54.8% of the population of eligible
voters in Missouri went to the polls.1 Nationwide, the 1988 elections for
President and Vice-President saw only a 50.2% turnout.2 This compares with
nationwide turnouts of 95.4% in Australia, 86.9% in West Germany, and
76.9% in Great Britain3 . In fact, the United States now ranks 19th among the
nations of the world in average voter turnout, hardly an accolade for the
"leader of the free world."4 The 54.8% of Missourians who do bother to vote
are also apparently quite happy with the political leadership they have been
getting since 98% of the incumbents who ran for re-election to the General
Assembly in 1988 were re-elected.5 This also reflects a national trend; 1988
1. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1989, at 259, Table No. 436 (109th ed. 1989).
2. Id.
3. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, VOTE MISSOURI 5 (1988) (citing ORREN &
VERBA, AMERICAN VOTER PARTICIPATION: THE SHAPE OF THE PROBLEM 13 (1983)).
4. Id. The U.S. average voter turnout from 1945 to 1984 was 58.5% of the
eligible electorate. Id. However, this figure is obviously derived only from U.S.
presidential-year elections. If the off-year elections are averaged in, the rank would
be much lower. Further, since the nations cited in the text have parliamentary
elections, it is probably fairer to compare them with the average of all U.S. elections
rather than merely the presidential years. See also U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
supra note 1, at 258, Table No. 433, which indicates that, in off-year elections, the
highest voter turnouts were only 45.4% in both 1962 and 1966. Since then, the level
has trailed off until it reached only 33.4% of the eligible electorate in 1986. If the
trend continues, we may we see a voter turnout of less than 30% in 1990.
5. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1988 MISSOURI ANNUAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REPORT 131-60 (1989) (the 98% figure is a composite; 100% of the Senate
1
Dvorak: Dvorak: State Campaign Finance Law
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1990
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
saw the re-election of 98% of the incumbent candidates for U.S. Congress. 6
Indeed, more members of the U.S. Congress have managed to hang on to
office since 1980 than have members of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.
during the same period. Perhaps we should be more careful when we throw
around terms like "fossilized leadership" in reference to our Soviet friends.
This Comment argues that both of these phenomena, that is, low voter
turnout and the high rate at which incumbents are returned to office, are, at
least in part, the products of a system of electoral financing in this state and
in this nation which favors incumbents and which leaves voters with the
impression that their votes are of little significance when compared to the
power of the dollar in today's politics. This is not a new assertion8 and it is
one which has led to various types of statutory measures in almost every state
and at the federal level.9 These different state measures will be discussed and
compared with Missouri's campaign reporting act10 with an eye toward
refining or improving the Missouri law. First, let's take a look at the political
campaign and see what role money really plays.
incumbents were re-elected and 98% of the House members were re-elected). In the
Missouri Senate, seventeen seats were up for election; of these, eleven were held by
incumbents and all eleven incumbents were re-elected. Id. at 131-33. Indeed, seven
of the eleven incumbents did not even face a challenge in the general election. Id.
Only one state Senator, Irene Treppler, had a serious challenge and managed to scrape
by with a 50.3% victory; no other incumbent state senator standing for election
received less than 57% of the vote. Id. The story in the Missouri House of
Representatives is similar. Of the 142 incumbent members who sought re-election in
1988, 140 were elected-a 98% re-election rate for the House. Seventy-seven of these
were unopposed. Id. at 134-60.
6. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 252, Table No. 422. (the only
incumbent Congressman who sought re-election in 1986 and was defeated was
Missouri's own Robert Young of the 2d Congressional District; he lost to Republican
challenger Jack Buechner).
7. "Percentage of the current members of the Supreme Soviet who were in office
in 1980: 4. Percentage of the current members of the U.S. Congress who were in
office in 1980: 47." HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1990, at 41.
8. See, e.g., H. ALEXANDER, FINANCING POLrnCS: MONEY, ELECTIONS AND
POunCAL REFORM (2d ed. 1980) (one of the best general works on campaign
financing); MONEY AND POLIXCS IN THE UNITED STATES (M. Malbin ed. 1984)
(collection of essays on campaign financing by leading writers in the field).
9. See Appendix I to this Comment for a comprehensive listing of state campaign
finance laws. Federal campaign finance is governed by the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971 (FECA), 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1989).
10. Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 130 (1986).
[Vol. 55
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I. POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS: How THEY WORK
A. Money
Lyndon Johnson is purported to have said that "money is the mother's
milk of politics."'" That this is true in modern American politics is certainly
easy to demonstrate. Vast sums of money are required to run a modern
political campaign. Missouri is no exception to the rule. In 1986, former
Governor Kit Bond and Lieutenant Governor Harriett Woods set all-time
records for a statewide campaign in Missouri when each campaign spent in
excess of four million dollars to run a slick media-oriented campaign. 12 Data
published by the Secretary of State under Missouri's campaign finance
disclosure law13 show that spending on elections in Missouri increased by
$1.5 million from 1984 to 1988 alone. 4
11. The quote may be apocryphal. Certainly, LBJ would not mind getting credit
for it. See R. CARO, THE PATH TO POWER (1984).
12. U.S. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, FEC REPORTS ON FINANCIAL
AcnvITY 1985-1986: FINAL REPORT, U.S. SENATE AND HOUSE CAMPAIGNS (1988).
Bond spent $5.4 million; Woods spent $4.3 million, The Bond-Woods race is a
federal race and, although it was the most expensive in state history, it nevertheless
represents a trend which is reflected in races for Missouri state office as well. See,
e.g., R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1984 MISSOURI ANNUAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REPORT 1 (1985) (Governor John Ashcroft spent $1.5 million in 1984 to defeat Lt.
Governor Ken Rothman, who spent $1.1 million).
13. Mo. REV. STAT. cl. 130 (1986).
14. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1988 MISSOURi ANNUAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REPORT 3 (1989); see also R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1986 MISSOURI
ANNUAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT 4 (1987) (average cost of an election campaign
rose from 1982 to 1986 by approximately $1,000 per candidate from $3,592 per
candidate in 1982 to $4,845 in 1986); MONEY AND POLITICS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 8, at 173 (1980 gubernatorial election in Missouri, represented a 241%
increase in campaign spending over 1976; the candidates in both years were Joseph
Teasdale (D) and Kit Bond (R)).
1990]
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Table I"
Campaign Expenditures in General Election Campaigns
for Statewide Offices in Missouri, 1980-1988
1980 1984 1988
(D) (R) (D) (R) (D) (R)
Governor 1,320,000 1,370,000 1,100,000 1,500,000 362,149 2,123,453
Lt. Governor 146,544 96,990 355,125 100,415 313,658 262,369
Secretary
of State 15,322 3,284 133,170 258,333 4,555 345,753
State
Treasurer 95,320 11,852 277,560 217,235 235,070 338,517
Attorney
General 7,319 128,319 244,130 362,004 52,810 598,649
Table 216
Campaign Expenditures in Primary Election Campaigns
by Primary Election Victors for Candidates
for Statewide Office in Missouri, 1980-1988
1980 1984 1988
(D) (R) (D) (R) (D) (R)
Governor 1,379,083 480,394 812,200 1,478,373 446,228 1,339,900
Lt. Governor 146,662 64,555 219,460 39,258 66,258 103,262
Secretary
of State 10,547 1,073 96,333 81,846 755 100,667
State
Treasurer 206,524 1,543 111,927 33,226 166,727 87,780
Attorney
General 1,785 64,278 17,573 114,724 74,354 128,680
What do candidates do with all that money? It used to be that when
candidates spent money it was on organization and on travel; advertising costs
were likely limited to printing a few posters and campaign buttons. Today,
however, we are seeing a revolution in the way political campaigns are run.
The modern campaign is a slick, action-packed, advertising-oriented
phenomenon which requires vast sums of money to sustain. Now candidates
15. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1988 ANNUAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT
129-30 (1989); R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1984 ANNUAL CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REPORT 101-04 (1985); J. KIRKPATRICK, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1980 ANNUAL
CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORT 129-33 (1981).
16. 1988 REPORT, supra note 15, at 9-11, 1984 REPORT, supra note 15, at 8-13;
1980 REPORT, supra note 15, at 14-21.
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spend nearly as much time raising money for their television advertising as
they do in actually campaigning. Another side effect of the campaign
revolution has been the birth of an industry. In their desperation to reach
voters, candidates often rely on "independent" political consultants to raise
money for them and to produce and distribute their media advertising.17 This
"new campaigning" has led to the creation of a virtual cottage industry
throughout the United States which, is barely distinguishable from the
advertising industry.18 The tools of the trade include such effective fund-
raising techniques as direct mail. Direct mail is to politics what junk mail is
to marketing. 9 It is an effort to get the candidate's nameout in front of the
voter and to convince him to contribute to the campaign. Although vast sums
of money can be raised in this way, it is also an expensive operation to run
with immense start up costs. 20 It may take years before a direct mail list
becomes productive.21 The upshot of all this is that much of the money
spent on "campaigning" actually winds up in the hands of this new industry
and has no bearing at all on encouraging a more effective public dialogue.
So, the effects of money in modern political campaigns are easily seen.
The search for money leads politicians to spend a great deal of their time
raising it-and this is true even once a candidate becomes an officeholder.
Money also acts as a gate to the political process by effectively closing off
those who don't have the connections or the intestinal fortitude for the endless
fundraising effort required. Finally, money is needed because the campaign
revolution has led to an entire industry bent on convincing candidates that the
media campaign is the only way to win. The media mavens urge an
advertising campaign and forsake the older methods of campaigning which
concentrated on people and on building organizations for reasons which have
17. See S. BLUMENTHA THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN (1980) (personal portraits
of leading campaign consultants); F. LuNTz, CANDIDATES, CONSULTANTS AND
CAMPAIGNS (1988); L. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS (1981) (the
preferred overview).
18. L. SABATO, supra note 17, at 111-219. The rise of consultants may be part
of an increasing trend in society toward a TV/Entertainment orientation. See MITROFF
& BENNIS, THE UNREALITY INDUSTRY (1989) Mitroff and Bennis argue that the
pervasive influence of advertising and entertainment in America are creating an
atmosphere of unreality which makes it increasingly difficult for Americans to deal
with very real problems. They believe this is a general trend throughout society and
are critical of the news media, but also note that it has affected American politics
dramatically. "Instead of leaders, we have celebrities and stars, specialists in solo
turns, and we have McHeroes, like [Oliver] North, whom the media crank out in
extraordinary numbers for our momentary delectation." Id. at 155.
19. L. SABATO, supra note 17, at 220-63.
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more to do with their own self interest than anything else. In effect, campaign
consultants lobby candidates for business. What this means for the average
voter is that the politician is increasingly becoming a distant phosphorescent
TV image rather than a real human being who represents him in the
government. So, that's where the money goes; now that we know where it
goes, from whence does it come?
B. The Money-Givers
Probably the best way to answer that question is to start at the very
beginning: the beginning of a political career.' Men and women go into
politics for a wide variety of reasons, ranging from an ideologically-based
desire to re-make the world to a more egocentric view based on attaining the
celebrity status often accorded our political leaders. Whatever the reason, the
serious entrant to a political race faces one immediate question: where will
the money come from? In small races, such as a race for city council or for
the state legislature, the potential candidate will probably begin by sounding
out friends and acquaintances and getting some financial help from them.
Those friends will contact their friends. Sooner or later, word will get to the
local "heavy hitters," that is, individuals or businesses who will contribute the
larger sums of money necessary to run a modern campaign even in a small
local race.
This scenario, which plays itself out over and over every election year,
leads to two immediate consequences. First, candidates who are from the
upper classes and who can form a network among the middle class and the
wealthy are more likely to raise substantial sums of money than are less well-
to-do candidates. Second, the naive first-time candidate is likely to view
anyone who is willing to contribute to his campaign as being a supporter of
his views. He is much less likely to view a contribution at this stage as an
attempt to buy influence or anything of the kind. Consequently, the candidate
will develop friendly and important ties to certain interests in the community
who contribute to the campaign even before it becomes apparent just what
kind of game is being played. The candidate will see the relationship as one
of mutual friendship and support, not as that of buying and selling influence.
22. Much of what follows in this section is the product of the author's personal
experience and insight gained from participation in electoral politics. The author was
an Alternate Delegate to the 1980 Democratic Convention, a Delegate to both the 1980
and 1988 Missouri Democratic State Conventions, and is currently Democratic
Committeeman in Boone County for the 6th Ward of Columbia. The author has also
participated as both a volunteer and paid staff member in political campaigns ranging
in scope from city council elections to national campaigns.
[Vol. 55
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Would these relationships be formed at all if the money element were
missing?' The answer is not clear. What is clear is that, as between
candidates who do form such relationships and those who don't, the
"establishment" candidate with the connections is better funded. Familiarity
with the modern political campaign and common sense alone dictate that,
money makes a difference. Fortunately, however, we do not need to rely on
common sense alone; there is ample evidence that a better funded campaign
is more likely to succeed. 4 This is especially true in an "open" seat where
no candidate is an incumbent2O
The story so far involves only the neophyte politician in a local
campaign. If the first step is successful, we may soon find our candidate
seeking a higher political office. Now the stakes increase. Let's say our
friend waits until a seat in his state senate district opens up. What does he
face? The average candidate for state senate in Missouri spent $16,554 in
1988.2 By now, with his experience at the local level, our candidate knows
full well that his contributors are after more than friendship or ideological
solidarity. He also knows that failing to raise the necessary money generally
23. Arguably, a candidate freed from the necessity of raising funds might never
form these relationships. However, if an interest group wants to influence public
policy and cannot do so through money and the creation of cozy, mutually-beneficial
relationships with politicians, they may simply encourage members of their own groups
to run for office. I would submit that this is a far more open and less insidious form
'of influencing public policy.
24. G. JACOBSEN, THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 41-42 (1983)
(Professor Jacobsen's research has shown that money is especially important to
challengers in congressional elections because they are less well-known than
incumbents and don't have the opportunity for generating free publicity as do
incumbents. His research has also shown that incumbents spend the most on
campaigns when they are challenged by well-financed opponents. Indeed, as a
statistical matter, an incumbent is much more likely to lose when he spends more
money). See also H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 16-18.
25. G. JACOBSEN, supra note 24, at 41-42. Incumbents have special advantages
which allow them to accomplish campaign publicity tasks without doing so through
their campaign. All members of the Missouri General Assembly, for example, are
entitled to send every constituent in their district an "informational" brochure at public
expense during each session of the legislature. Furthermore, incumbents regularly
appear in the media and are often quoted as a source of information on public affairs.
Consequently, it is quite common for incumbents to win in spite of being outspent by
challengers.
26. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1988 MISSOURI ANNUAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REPORT 2 (1989); see also H. ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 131-33 (Open
state senate races, where there is no incumbent candidate saw much higher expendi-
tures. In the 7th district in 1988, a total of $230,034 was spent by candidates in the
general election; in the 23d district, the total was $114,589).
1990]
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means ignominious defeat at the polls. Our up-and-coming politician will
rationalize his dependence on private funds and carry on. As his political
career matures, our friend will be overwhelmed by the amount of work it
takes to raise the money he needs to achieve his final goal-election as
Governor of Missouri. Raising the funds necessary for a campaign from
individual small contributors was difficult enough in a state senate race. Now
our candidate must come up with about three or four million dollars.27 He
will have to turn to big business for this.
So, what does all this mean? When all is said and done, it means that
special interest contributions make the difference between winning and losing
in American elections today. Although contributions from individuals still
make up the bulk of a candidate's campaign fund, candidates relying on small
contributors alone will surely be outspent by their opponents. In Missouri the
law also allows corporations to contribute directly to a candidate's fund.'
This is outlawed by the federal government and by many states. Further,
although the federal government and many states limit the amount of money
a political action committee (PAC) or individual may donate to a campaign,
there is no limit in Missouri to the contributions which may be made by
PACs, individuals, or'corporations. 29 Even forgetting this for a moment, the
role of PACs in campaign finance is increasing all across the United States
and Missouri is no exception. 0
PACs are Political Action Committees. They are legally independent
committees which, in reality, are nearly always formed to represent the
interests of an existing business, labor, or other interest by contributing to the
election campaigns of candidates for political office.31 PACs are allowed
under both state and federal law and were originated in the 1930s by labor
unions.32 They grew more slowly in the business sector but mushroomed
after 1974 so that business PACs now dominate the scene.33 Missouri has
27. 1988 REPORT, supra note 26, at 1.
28. Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.029 (1986).
29. Id.
30. F. SORAUF, MONEY IN AMERICAN ELECnONS 269 (1988) (citing Jones, State
and Federal Legislative Campaigns: Same Song, Different Verse, 3 ELECTION
POLInCs 8, 8-12 (1986)). In particular, Jones notes that in 1980, Missouri PACs
accounted for 15.7 percent of all receipts by legislative candidates. By 1984, the
percentage had risen'to 23.9 percent of all receipts. Id.
31. For an excellent work on PACs generally, see L. SABATO, PAC POWER:
INSIDE THE WORLD OF POLTICAL ACTION COMMITTEES (1984).
32. Id. at 5.
33. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text. L. SABATO, supra note 31, at
4-6 (corporate practice was to "launder" cash into campaigns before the advent of the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971; this is one reason why businesses did not
form PACs in great numbers until after that date).
[Vol. 55
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never banned direct contributions from corporations, so the impact of PACs
is less dramatic in races for state offices. 34 The growing influence of PACs
in American politics is well known and is a major part of the new political
landscape which has emerged over the past two decades. In sheer numbers
alone, the growth of PACs has been notable. In 1974, there were a total of
608 registered PACs; in 1987 there were 4,165.' 5 Most of this growth has
been in the area of corporate PACs, that is, PACs which represent the interests
of business corporations. In 1974 there were 89 corporate PACs: by 1987,
the number had grown to 1,775.36 PACs representing labor organizations
numbered 201 in 1974 and 364 in 1987-down from a high of 394 labor
PACs in 1984.37 The whole notion of a PAC is to influence legislation by
helping candidates who support the issues of a particular interest group.
Consequently, PACs tend to inordinately support incumbents.38
C. What Do Contributors Get for their Money?
When an individual contributes to a political campaign, what is he trying
to get? Is he trying to get anything at all? Or, is he merely attempting to
foster good government or help a friend get elected to office? Does it make
a difference if the money comes from an individual or from an organization
such as a PAC or a corporation? These are important questions because the
answers to them go to the very heart of the ethical difficulties with money and
politics.
Many observers suggest that most political contributions are not given in
search of a particular quid pro quo.39 Most PAC presidents or corporate
chiefs will insist that, at most, the fact that they have contributed to a
particular candidate might tend to give them better access to him once he is
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 130.029 (1986).
35. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 262, Table No. 442.
36. Id. The increase is even more dramatic if PACs connected with cooperatives,
trade and professional organizations and PACs representing non-stock corporations are
added. The 1987 figure would increase from 1,775 to 2,026. The figures for 1974
lumped the non-corporate business PACs into an amorphous "other" category, so direct
comparison is unavailable. Id.
37. Id.
38. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, supra note 1, at 263, Table No. 444. Again,
federal statistics are readily available-in 1979-80, PACs contributed a total of $37.9
million to U.S. congressional campaigns. Of this, $24.9 million went to incumbents
and only $7.9 million to challengers. Id. In 1985-86, the trend continues, but the
growth in PAC spending is readily apparent. Total contributions for 1985-86 to
congressional candidates were $87.4 million. Id. Of this figure, $65.9 million went
to incumbents and $9.1 million to challengers. Id.
39. H. ALEXANDER, iupra note 8, at 148-49.
1990]
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in office.' Indeed, it is difficult to prove any direct correlation between
money changing hands and the purchase of political views.41 Often, a
discussion in this area leads to a "chicken and egg" question since contribu-
tions may be made on the basis of a politician's being predisposed to views
which the contributor finds favorable. The fact that a Texas congressman
receives a lot of money from oil interests does not necessarily mean his votes
on oil issues have been purchased since he can be characterized as "voting his
district." Oil interests and Texan interests are often not dissimilar.
These explanations are, however, fundamentally dissatisfying.4" The
problem is that they assume the monies which change hands represent a
payoff for a specific deed. Often, however, this is not the intention at all.
Instead, what large political contributors are buying is an attitude. Their
function is to help individuals who will be helped. Politicians pursue policy
courses in order to get re-elected; indeed this has been viewed as the
politician's proximate goal.4 3 The political goals of the politician constantly
40. L. SABATO, supra note 31, at 27.
41. The difficulty of such proof is obvious: For every legislative vote which
appears at first glance to be the product of influence, there are many other legitimate
rationales which might be articulated to justify it. Politics is, after all, partly the
process of sorting out different viewpoints to arrive at public policy. Consequently,
this author would assert that it would be just about impossible to really establish
statistical "proof' of a relationship between contributions and voting. This opinion has
not, however, stopped others from trying to do so. See, e.g., Schroedel, Campaign
Contributions and Legislative Outcomes, 39:3 W. POL. Q. 371 (1986); Austen-Smith,
Interest Groups, Campaign Contributions and Probabilistic Voting, 54 PUB. CHOICE
123 (1987) (suggesting a relationship between dollars and votes, but also fairly
illustrating the difficulty of statistical "proof' in this regard).
42. Indeed,.such explanations are not believed even by members of Congress.
See, e.g., SABATO, supra note 31, at 126-27 (The author quotes several members of
Congress who commented on the question of what PACs were out to buy with their
money: "Anytime someone, whether a person or a PAC, gives you a large sum of
money, you can't help but feel the need to give them extra attention, whether it is
access to your time or, subconsciously, the obligation to vote with them." -Rep. John
Bryant (Texas); "The only reason it isn't considered bribery is that Congress gets to
define bribery."-Rep. Andrew Jacobs (Indiana)).
43. D. MAYHEW, CONGRESs: THE ELECTORAL CONNECrION 5 (1974) (Although
Mayhew was writing about the U.S. Congress, it is fair to make the extension to state
legislatures as well. He characterized Congressmen as "single-minded seekers of re-
election."). See also J. Hitt, et al., What's Wrong With the Democrats?, HARPER'S
MAGAZINE, Jan. 1990, at 45. This was a forum of prominent Democrats. At one
point, Professor Benjamin Barber accused Congressman Barney Frank of ignoring the
merits of policy proposals in order to win elections. The following exchange occurred:
"BARBER: You only want to win elections, Barney! That's what's wrong. FRANK:
No. It's about making public policy .... BARBER: You only want to win. FRANK:
[Vol. 55
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interact with the political goals of various interests. Contacts are made.
Alliances are formed. At least for a time, the politician and the interest group
may work hand-in-hand. Later, the interest groups will return the "favor" by
showing up at a political fundraiser with a check. Whether this is a "payoff'
is open to argument. Absent more evidence, it is certainly not an illegal bribe.
The statistical relationship may be difficult or impossible to establish. No set
of statistics or legal definitions can quite get rid of the queasy feeling one gets
from such activity. In the Missouri legislature, the situation is exacerbated by
the fact that lobbyists and not the legislature itself are generally the best
source of information on pending legislation which is available to legisla-
tors." Consequently, interaction with the lobbyists in not a luxury but a
necessity.
For the upwardly mobile politician, that is, the politician who is
interested in gaining higher office, a large campaign war chest and the "right"
alliances are necessary. Because the vast majority of the money which is
handed out by "interests" comes from the business sector45, politicians are
gradually forced to accede to business interests to get ahead. This is not
shocking to most seasoned politicians; they are well aware that this is the way
the game is played before they begin.
D. The Money-Bringers
Knowing where the money comes from does not paint the whole picture.
The practice in Missouri is often for corporations and PACs to hire profession-
al lobbyists to represent their interests in Jefferson City.4 Lobbyists are at
the capitol during much of the legislative session; they testify on behalf of
bills which interest or affect their clients and they meet regularly with
legislators to insure that their client's views are known.47 One commonly
used technique is to discuss issues with legislators over dinner and then to
We want to win to affect public policy." Id. at 51-52 (emphasis added).
44. See infra note 46 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. In Missouri, the lack of a ban on
direct campaign contributions by corporations accentuates the "pro-business"
atmosphere of interest giving.
46. See HARDY & DOHM, MissouRI GOVERNMENT AND PoIncs (1985) 32. (In
Missouri, lobbying at the state legislature is dominated by several large lobbying firms
each of which serves several, often diverse interests. For example, in 1982 lobbyist
John Britton lobbied on behalf of such diverse Missouri businesses as Anheuser-Busch,
Inc., Hallmark Cards, Inc., and Famous Barr).
47. Id. at 29-32.
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pick up the dinner tab.' Consequently, most lobbyists spend large sums on
entertainment throughout a typical legislative session.49
The importance of lobbyists lies not only in their ability to direct
corporate and PAC money into the coffers of various office holders, but also
in the role they play as "information couriers" in the state capitol.5 The
Missouri state legislature has no institutional means to provide its members
with detailed, unbiased information about the rationale behind a bill or the
amendments to a bill.5' Consequently, when a legislator attempts to make
a decision on a particular bill, he is faced with the bare statutory language.
Even lawyers experienced at reading statutory language will admit that the
meaning of a bill is not always immediately apparent from that language
alone. Language added or deleted in committee is indicated, but the tricky
48. Id. at 29 (quoting a new state senator as saying, "One of the hardest things
to get used to when I first came here was not buying my own dinner.").
49. Id. at 31 (In 1982, lobbyists of all stripes spent a grand total of $583,340 to
influence the legislature. Of this, $531,001 was spent by "private sector" lobbyists
with the rather paltry remainder coming from agencies of the state and local
government who are required under Missouri law to register as lobbyists. Fifty-one
percent of all the money spent went to "entertainment"). The trend continues. See,
e.g., Egan & Watson, THE STATESMAN, supplement to The Jefferson City News
Tribune, Jan. 1990, at 1-2. (1989 spending figures for the "top five" lobbyists in
Jefferson City were as follows: John Britton & Associates: $63,422; Gene Worn
(Missouri Auto Dealers Ass'n): 36,763; John Bardgett: $33,180; Richard E. McFadin:
$32,085; Richard C. Wiles: $31,013).
• 50. HARDY & DOHM, supra note 46, at 30. ("[S]tate legislators generally find
lobbyists useful in the information-gathering process.... Perhaps one Missouri
legislator spoke for his colleagues as well as himself when he said, 'I use lobbyists as
much as they use me."') Egan & Watson, "Lobbyists: A Powerful Fixture in the
Capitol Hallways, THE STATESMAN, supplement to The Jefferson City News Tribune,
Jan. 1990, at 2. (containing another insight into the "information power" of lobbyists
at the state capitol: "Lobbyists are good providers of information, and if we were to
eliminate the lobbyists that work in Jefferson City, staff would have to go up another
50 to 100 percent to provide us the same kind of information," said Senate President
Jim Mathewson, D-Sedalia).
51. In contrast, Congress publishes a veritable tidal wave of information about
every aspect of legislation. Bills reported out of committee are literally accompanied
by a written "report" which details the hearings held on the bill and the reasons behind
any changes made during mark-up. Debate on the floor of both the U.S. House and
U.S. Senate is not only videotaped and broadcast live nationwide but is also available
in textual form on a daily basis in the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD. No comparable
avenue for the flow of information is available to inquisitive legislators in Jefferson
City.
52. Only 21 of the 197 members of the 85th General Assembly (1989-90) are
lawyers. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, OFFICIAL MANUAL, STATE OF MISSOURI
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reasons which lie behind the addition or deletion of language are not
explained. Currently, the only means for a legislator to find out why a bill
was rewritten is to ask a member of the committee, to go to the markup
hearing (unlikely), or to rely on a lobbyist. 3 This is all the more insidious
when one realizes that the very lobbyist upon whom the legislator must rely
for this information may also be the very same lobbyist who instigated the
revision. Changes to bills are likely to be described as "merely technical" or
"not worth worrying about," when in fact they may be important. Even in the
absence of outright deception, is it right to allow our lawmakers to rely on
special interests to explain why a bill is or is not worded a certain way? The
fact that the state does not publish information about the history or meaning
of a proposed law also negatively impacts the judicial system of the state.
Missouri lawyers who have searched for a legislative history behind a
particular statute know well the paucity of.information in this area.54
II. WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION:
STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
Every one of the fifty states has enacted legislation aimed at limiting the
influence or at least the appearance of influence which money has in
American politics.5 5 Every state has at least minimal requirements for the
reporting of expenditures and contributions by candidates and political
committees.5 6 The federal government has also enacted campaign finance
legislation and easily has the most progressive laws in this area at the present
time. The federal law is, however, beyond the scope of this Comment.'
Beyond these reporting requirements, the extent to which various state
governments have regulated the political campaign process varies greatly.
Some states actually provide for public funding of state political races.58 Of
those which do provide public funding, there is great variety as to which races
1989-1990 ch. 4 (1990).
53. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for an example of the extent to
which legislators actually do rely on lobbyists for information.
54. The unavailability of legislative histories and the negative effect this has on
Missouri's court system constitutes another reason for urging the legislature to better
document its hearings and debates.
55. See Appendix I of this Comment for an exhaustive survey of state campaign
finance laws.
56. Id.
57. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1982).
58. See Appendix II of this Comment for a breakdown of states according to
various systems of public finance.
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are funded, how extensively they are funded and how the revenues for these
programs are collected. 9
Other states have declined to provide public funding and have instead
relied on publication of campaign contributions as a means of informing the
public.' Still others have placed certain limitations on the size of contribu-
tions or have prohibited contributions from corporations or labor unions or
both.' Only one state, Montana, has attempted to limit the amount a
candidate for public office may receive as contributions.62
A. Campaign Finance Disclosure Laws
Disclosure laws do not attempt to limit the level of influence which
money plays in modern politics, but to reveal it. They do so by providing a
mechanism by which the public is informed as to the extent and nature of
interest funding which a politician receives. Some states accompany their
campaign finance disclosure laws with limits on the size of contributions, but
others do not.63 Missouri's law is typical and requires regular reporting of
all contributions in excess of $100.00 and all PAC contributions received by
candidates and political committees. 4 It places no limits on contributions
and does not prohibit, as many state laws do, direct contributions from
corporations or labor unions.65
B. Public Financing Laws
Despite the laudable aspects of campaign finance reporting laws, many
states have concluded that such laws do not go far enough. To insure better
access to the political process by all members of society-regardless of
income-and to relieve politicians of the necessity for relying on monetary
help from interests with an axe to grind, public financing of elections has been
59. See Appendices I and II of this Comment for a summary of the campaign
finance laws of all fifty states; see also U.S. FEDERAL ELECrION COMMISSION,
CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw '88 (1989) (a comprehensive survey of state campaign
finance laws and regulations with helpful summary tables).
60. Missouri's statute is typical. See Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 130 (Supp. 1989).
61. See Appendix II.
62. MONT. CODE ANN. § 13-37-218 (1989).
63. See Appendices I and II.
64. Mo. REV. STAT. ch. 130 (Supp. 1989).
65. See Appendix II of this Comment for a survey of state laws with regard to
the limitation of corporate political contributions; Missouri's law with regard to
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implemented. These programs provide a mechanism by which all or part of
certain state political campaigns are funded with tax dollars to diminish
private influence in elections. Usually, a cap is also placed on how much a
candidate can spend on his campaign as well. Currently, in the United States,
twenty two states and the federal government have some form of public
finance for election campaigns.6 At the state level, there are large differenc-
es among the goals of various public finance systems and, consequently, in the
nature of the laws which were enacted. Public financing schemes have,
however, had difficulty passing constitutional muster. Generally, these
difficulties have involved the campaign spending limits imposed on candidates
who accept public funding. In a landmark case involving the Federal Election
Campaign Act but having repercussions for state public financing schemes as
well, the United States Supreme Court decided in Buckley v. Valeo67 that
campaign contributions from the personal funds of the candidate could not be
limited unless that candidate accepted public funding.' It is not, however,
the aim of this Comment to discuss the constitutional issues involved in
campaign finance law.69
At this point, it will be useful to examine the public funding mechanisms
of three states, Minnesota, Iowa, and New Jersey, to provide a useful
comparison of different modes of public funding and the successes and
difficulties of these differing approaches. These three states were chosen
because they typify the three major approaches to the public financing
problem.
66. See Appendix II.
67. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
68. Id. This decision has been much criticized. See, e.g., Wright, Money and the
Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82
CoL L. REV. 609 (1982); Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?,
85 YALE L. J. 1001 (1976) (J. Skelly Wright was the United States Appeals Court
judge whose opinion in Buckley allowing the spending limits established by Congress
was overturned by the Supreme Court). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821
(D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
69. There are many excellent articles and works on this subject. A sampling
would include: Wright, supra note 68; Shockley, Money in Politics: Judicial
Roadblocks to Campaign Finance Reform, 10 HAsT. CONsT. L. Q. 679 (1983); Claude
and Kirchhoff, The 'Free Market' of Ideas, Independent Expenditures, and Influence,
57 N. D. L. REV. 337 (1981); Polsby, Buckley v. Valeo: The Special Nature of
Political Speech, 1976 SUP. CT. REv. 1 (1977).
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C. Public Funding of Elections in Minnesota
Minnesota has one of the most broad-based and comprehensive systems
of campaign finance regulations in the United States.70 It has a sophisticated
campaign reporting law,71 along with a widely accepted system for publicly
financing candidates for statewide office as well as candidates for the state
legislature.72 Consequently, the Minnesota law represents a polar opposite
from states like Missouri which merely have reporting statutes and make no
real effort to regulate the campaign funding process.
For the most part, the Minnesota law has escaped a potential pitfall for
a public funding program which is comprehensive and attempts to fund
elections down to the state legislative level. Many such programs attempt to
spread too little money too far and wind up being ineffective deterrents to
excessive private influence.73 Hawaii, for example, has enacted public
funding which extends to the local and municipal level.74 Commentators
have called it ineffective because, at the local level, the public contribution is
as low as fifty dollars per candidate.75 Rather than attempting to enact a
comprehensive law as Minnesota has done, other states often opt to fund only
major statewide races or to fund political parties.76
Public financing in Minnesota is provided through a five dollar checkoff
provision on both the state income tax return and on renter or homeowner
property tax refund returns.77 Joint returns allow a ten dollar checkoff.
78
70. See, e.g., U.S. FEDERAL ELECrION COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN '88, Part I, Chart
4 (1989). Only three states have a comprehensive scheme of public funding for
statewide offices: Hawaii, Minnesota and Wisconsin. Hawaii's is the broadest
program and funds candidates for virtually every state office include local and
municipal offices. The Hawaii law, however, spreads itself too thin and suffers by
allocating very small amounts of money to many races. Wisconsin's law is more
similar to Minnesota's law. Id.
71. MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.01 (1989).
72. See id. §§ 10A.31-.44; see also F. SORAUF, supra note 30, at 280 (Minne-
sota's public financing law has been widely utilized by candidates. In 1984, 84.3%
of Democratic and 75.2% of Republican candidates accepted public financing. In
1982, the acceptance rate was even higher, with 96.9% of Democratic and 83.2% of
Republican candidates taking funds).
73. See, e.g., F. SORAUF, supra note 30, at 279.
74. Id.; see also HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-217 (1989).
75. See, e.g., F. SORAUF, supra note 30, at 279.
76. See U.S. FEDERAL ELECION COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW '88, Part
I, Chart 4 (1989). Thirteen states publicly fund political parties; six states publicly
fund all or some statewide elective offices only; only Hawaii, Minnesota and
Wisconsin attempt a more comprehensive effort. Id.
77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.31 (West 1988).
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Taxpayers may designate that their checkoff funds go to a particular political
party, with such monies placed in a segregated party fund.79 Taxpayers may
also designate that their checkoff funds be placed into a general fund rather
than into a party account.80
The funds are distributed according to a rather complicated formula1
which includes provisions to insure that the monies'are more or less returned
to the county from which they initially came.' Candidates who accept
public funding are bound by expenditure limitations.8 3 To meet the require-
ments of Buckley, Minnesota does not place spending limitations on candidates
who decline to accept public funds or on the amounts which candidates
themselves may contribute, whether or not they participate in public
financing.'
In recent elections, candidates in Minnesota have opted to use public
financing in their campaigns. In 1982, for example, 96.9% of Democratic and
83.2% of Republican candidates accepted public monies-a much higher




81. See id. § 10A.31(5)-(7). Monies deposited to the general fund are allocated
to candidates for the following offices: 21% for governor and lieutenant governor;
3.6% to attorney general; 1.8% each for secretary of state, state auditor and state
treasurer; 23.33% for state senators and 46.66% for state representatives in years
during which state senators are serving four-year terms; 35% each for state senators
and state representatives in years during which state senators are serving a two-year
term. Id. Monies in the party funds are allocated as follows: 10% for the operation
of the state committee with certain limitations on its use; 14% for governor and
lieutenant governor; 2.4% for attorney general; 1.2% each for secretary of state, state
auditor and state treasurer; same as general fund for state senators and state
representatives. Id.
82. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 10A.31(5)(a)-(c) (West 1988) (formula is based on
the aggregate number of votes cast at the last general election within a particular part
of a district within a particular county for all candidates on the party's ticket divided
by the number of votes cast in the entire county for all candidates on the party's ticket
multiplied by the amount of money allocated from the party account to that county).
83. Id. § 10A.25 (the limitations are as follows: governor/It. governor, $600,000;
attorney general, $100,000; secretary of state, state treasurer and state auditor, $50,000
each; state senator, $15,000; state representative $7,500).
84. U.S. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAw '88: A
SUMMARY OF STATE CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAws WITH QUICK REFERENCE CHARTS,
Part II, at MN-16 (1989).
85. See supra note 71; see also F. SORAUF, supra note 30, at 280.
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D. Public Funding of Elections in Iowa
Unlike Minnesota, Iowa has chosen to fund only political parties through
its system of public funding. Individual candidates do not receive funds
directly from the state under the Iowa scheme. The public financing
mechanism is funded through an income tax checkoff of $1.50 with the
taxpayer having the choice whether the monies will go to the Republican or
Democratic parties.8 The state maintains separate accounts for each party
and contributes the monies generated plus interest to the parties on a regular
basis.' The law gives discretion to the state central committee of each party
as to how the monies will be spent.8 The law also sets up a mechanism for
the reporting of campaign expenditures and contributions by candidate and
political committees and requires the state central committee to file reports
regarding its use of public funds.89
The reasoning behind Iowa's preference for funding the political parties
rather than funding candidates directly is a response to another phenomenon
of the campaign revolution. As candidates have increasingly grown to rely on
advertising techniques and on independent political consultants to manage
their campaigns, there has been a concomitant decline in the importance and
power of the political party in American politics. This decline has been
attributed to many factors including the loss of control over the nominating
process which began with the widespread enactment of primary election laws.
The Iowa law reflects an attempt to remedy this situation by returning money
power to the parties. In all, nine states have chosen to funnel public funding
monies through the political parties in a manner similar to Iowa.90
86. IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.18 (West 1989) The law does not actually limit the
contributions to the two major parties; however, the major effect has been to fund the
Republican and Democratic parties. See also id. § 56.19 (provides for a mechanism
by which funds are not designated by the taxpayer toward a specific party may be
divided among the existing parties having accounts in the Iowa election campaign
fund).
87. IowA CODE ANN. § 56.19 (West 1989). See also id. § 56.22 (requires that
the monies accumulated in the Iowa election campaign fund be remitted to the parties
on the first day of each month).
88. IOWA CODE ANN. § 56.21 (West 1989).
89. Id. § 56.6 (Sets forth the requirements for campaign finance reports by
candidates and political committees. Requires periodic reporting of campaign
contributions received which exceed $25.00 in most elections, but allows contributions
as high as $200.00 to go unreported for any committee of a national political party and
state statutory political parties). See also id. § 56.23 (requires the chairmen of state
political parties to "produce evidence" to the state campaign finance commission that
public funds have been utilized exclusively for campaign purposes).
90. See Appendix II.
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The "party-funding" concept has merit if the aim is to strengthen parties.
There is evidence that it has strengthened the party structure in those states
which have enacted this type of funding legislation.9' On the other hand, if
the aim of public funding is to reduce the impact of interest money in
campaigns, arguably it has not done so effectively because there is often no
requirement that the funds be widely distributed by the parties to a great
number of their candidates.' Consequently, individual candidates are often
left to fend for themselves and conduct election campaigns without any help
from their publicly-funded party apparatus.93  Additionally, by favoring
political parties, these laws make it more difficult for third party or indepen-
dent candidates to obtain access to funding and consequently serve to
perpetuate the ossified and increasingly irrelevant major parties.
E. Public Funding of Elections in New Jersey
As mentioned in our discussion of the Minnesota law, New Jersey is one
of only two states which seriously attempts to fund a significant portion of a
candidate's campaign expenses through public funding.94 New Jersey has
chosen to do so by limiting the scope of funding to the office of Governor.95
The funding is provided by a one dollar income tax checkoff and may be
supplemented by funds from the general revenues of the state if necessary.
96
The law was enacted in 1977 in response to a campaign financing scandal
associated with former Governor William Cahill.97 It provides for extensive
funding of all aspects of the gubernatorial campaign, including both the
primary and general election campaigns for both major parties.
91. Jones, State Public Campaign Finance: Implications for Partisan Politics, 25
AM. J. POL. Scd. 342 (1981); see also F. SoRAUF, supra note 30, at 76-77.
92. F. SORAUF, supra note 30 at 76-77.
93. Id.
94. The other state is Michigan. See MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §§ 169.261-.265
(West 1989).
95. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 19:44A-27 (West 1989) ("It is the intention of this act that
such financing be adequate in amount so that candidates for election to the office of
Governor may conduct their campaigns free from improper influence and so that
persons of limited financial means may seek election to the State's highest office.").
96. Id. § 54A:9-25.1 (establishes the New Jersey Gubernatorial Elections Fund);
see id §§ 19:44A-30 (allows for appropriations from the state's general revenues as
necessary "to carry out the purposes of th[e] act").
97. Edelman, A Reform Worth Reforming: Campaign Finance in New Jersey,
NAT'L Civic REV. 417 (1985) (history of the New Jersey law and a call for continuing
reform).
98. Id. at 417-18, 423. Qaw was amended in 1981 to provide public funding
during the primaries after more than $5 million was spent by eleven primary
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The law has succeeded in making public funding the dominant source of
funding for campaigns for governor in New Jersey since its enactment in
1977.' In the 1985 campaign, for example, primary candidates of both
parties received approximately 59% of their campaign funds through public
funding; in the general election, this figure rose to 60 %.1" ° The intended
effect of these large infusions of public support is to reduce the influence of
interests in electoral process by reducing the marginal effect of a single
campaign contribution. Other states, such as Hawaii, have been less
successful in making pblic funding the main source of support for candi-
dates. 1' The Hawaii law attempts to fund a large number of races, but due
to limited resources, provides only nominal support for many.'0
F. The Missouri Experience: A Call for Change
Missouri has not enacted any form of public funding for state officials.
Neither has it chosen to limit contributions to political campaigns or even to
rule out contributions by labor unions and corporations. Indeed, Missouri's
regulations with regard to political campaigns are among the least stringent in
the United States.'03 The Missouri campaign finance disclosure law, enacted
in 1978, has undergone only minor reform since that date."° It is essential-
ly a campaign reporting act and requires that all contributions in excess of
$100.00 and that all expenditures be reported to the office of the Secretary of
State. Only a few proposals for a more extensive system of campaign finance
regulation have been made and they have been uniformly unsuccessful.
Consequently, the Missouri law has done little more than provide a useful
base of information which allows public examination of campaign finance.
candidates in both parties).
99. F. SORAUF, supra note 30, at 281.
100. Id.
101. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 11-217 (1985).
102. HAW. REv. STAT. § 11-218 (1989) (provides public funding for local offices,
but requires that such funding shall not exceed $500.00 per candidate-hardly enough
money to reduce the effectiveness of the next private dollar even in a local race).
103. See J. PALMER & E. FEIGENBAUM, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW 88 (1988).
Missouri has extensive requirements for reporting campaign receipts and expenditures.
Other than limitations on cash contributions, however, there are no limits on the
amounts which may be contributed to campaigns by individuals or PACs. Corpora-
tions and labor unions, which are prohibited from making direct campaign contribu-
tions in many states may do so in Missouri. Only eleven other states have such
completely wide open laws with regard to the amount which may be contributed to
political campaigns.
104. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 130.011-.096 (1986 & Supp. 1989).
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Missouri is the fifteenth largest state in the United States in terms of
population.'0 5 It is the home of many major corporations and has a strong
labor movement. As described above, politics in this state are increasingly
dominated by the influence of PACs, corporations and labor unions who are
able to contribute unlimited sums of money to candidates for elective office
in Missouri. There is considerable evidence that this influence negatively
affects representative government in Missouri. Money is a barrier to many
challengers and gives incumbents the edge. Why give to someone who is not
in the legislature and cannot help you when you can give to an incumbent.
Consequently, it is beginning to seem as though our state legislators are
elected "legislator for life" in the context of our modern elections. In 1988,
only 77 of the 142 incumbent state representatives who stood for re-election
faced a challenge.' 6 In the same year, only 6 of the 11 incumbent state
senators faced a challenge. 1' 7
All of this raises serious questions regarding in whose interests the state
of Missouri is being run. Again, it is difficult or impossible to "prove" that
our state officials are beholden to the special interests who fund their political
campaigns, but the amount of money involved leads one inevitably to believe
that those interests would not be spreading dollars so thickly if they did not
expect some return from them. It is worth remembering the comment of S &
L king Charles Keating that the contributions he made to five U.S. Senators
were made in the expectation of some sort of action on his behalf. 0 8 Such
candor is rare, but revealing. Characterizing political contributions as being
simply the products of corporate or organizational desires for "good govern-
ment" are implausible to the point of being laughable. Contributors have
every reason to want to insure that only laws favorable to them are enacted
and the amount they budget for political contributions is negligible compared
to the possible losses which unfavorable legislation could bring. Never mind
the overall public interest. They do not care about it.
In order to create an atmosphere in which our public officials can be
trusted to act in the public interest, Missouri should enact some form of public
financing for political campaigns and the legislature should also act to
improve the flow of information within the legislature regarding pending
legislation. The experience of states like New Jersey suggests that a public
105. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1986-1987
467 (1986).
106. R. BLUNT, SECRETARY OF STATE, 1988 MISSOURI ANNUAL CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REPORT 134-60 (1989).
107. Id. at 131-33.
108. M. Carlon, Money Talks: Interview with Charles Keating, Time, Apr. 1990,
at 18 (Keating's oft-quoted reply to a reporter's question whether Keating intended his
contributions to five United States senators to influence them: "I certainly hope so.").
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funding program might work best if limited to major state races. Such a
limitation would allow the level of public funding to be a significant portion
of a statewide candidate's campaign budget. Limits should be placed on
campaign spending for those who choose to accept the funding. As for the
state legislature, Missouri faces a special difficulty; namely, it has one of the
largest state legislatures in the United States."° The sheer number of office
holders in the legislature may mean that publicly funding all of these
campaigns is beyond the means of a program funded by the traditional income
tax checkoff method. One solution would be public funding for the major
statewide officials combined with funding for the state political parties with
incentives or requirements for the parties to pass some of the money back to
their candidates for the state legislature. The political parties may be better
able to target and use such monies more effectively and increase competition
for office where it is currently absent.
G. Summary of Recent Missouri Legislation
The 1990 legisative session in Missouri saw the introduction of two bills
in the state senate dealing with the public finance of political campaigns in
Missouri.1"0 At this writing, it is impossible to say what the final legislative
outcome will be, but the political and fiscal climate in the legislature will no
doubt give these bills considerable difficulty. Both bills introduced this year
provide income tax checkoff funding and public funding for some or all
Missouri statewide officials."'
1. Senate Bill 474
This bill, introduced by Senator John Schneider of St. Louis County,
would create a "Campaign Trust Fund" funded through a two dollar income
tax checkoff similar to the federal income tax checkoff.12  Beginning in
1992, the funds accumulated in that fund would be distributed every four
years to all statewide officials and every two years to candidates for the state
109. See COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 107, at 87 (Missouri's
legislature, with 197 members, is the seventh largest in the nation. Only New
Hampshire, Pennsylvania, Georgia, Minnesota, Massachusetts and New York have
larger bodies).
110. S. 474, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Senator John
Schneider); S. 655, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess. (1990) (introduced by Senator Jay
Nixon).
111. See supra note 110.
112. S. 474, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 2 (1990).
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legislature who have opposition."' Candidates for each office would
receive a certain share of the funds14 for use in the general election
only. n5 To meet the Buckley requirements, participation in the public
financing program would be optional. 6 Candidates who do choose to
participate will be subject to spending limits." 7
2. Senate Bill 655
This bill is similar to S.B. 474 in that it provides for the establishment of
a state campaign trust fueled through a two dollar income tax checkoff, but
differs mainly in that it is a matching funds scheme rather than a direct
funding scheme and in that it funds only statewide officials." 8 The bill is
also similar to S.B. 474 in that it funds only general election candidates." 9
Again, to meet the strictures of Buckley, candidates are not required to accept
funding. 2 ° Candidates who are primary winners may receive matching
funds and must indicate their eligibility to do so by filing regular reports as
to private funds received as contributions.' Only contributions of $250 or
less may be matched by state funds. 22 Candidates who accept public
funding are limited as to the amount they may spend on their campaign.'2
113. Id. § 3.
114. Id. §§ 2-3 (funds would be distributed as follows: governor, $600,000;
lieutenant governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, attorney general and state
auditor, $200,000 each; state representative, $3,000; state senator, $9,000).
115. Id. § 4.
116. Id.
117. Id. §§ 5-7. All candidates for any office will be prohibited from accepting
contributions in excess of $5,000 per calendar year. Candidates for governor would
be subject to an aggregate general election spending limit of $1.5 million; candidates
for other statewide offices would be limited to spending $350,000 in the general
election; state senate candidates would be limited to $50,000; candidates for the state
House of Representatives could spend only $15,000. Id.
118. S. 655, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 3 (1990).
119. Id. § 4.
120. Id. § 3(1).
121. Id. § 4. The funds are allocated to each of the statewide offices and to
political parties according to the following formula: governor, 20%; 14% each to the
offices of It. governor, state treasurer, state auditor, secretary of state and attorney
general; 10% of the fund is allocated to state political parties. Id. § 4(1).
122. S. 655, 85th Gen. Assembly, 2d Sess., § 4(2) (1990).
123. Id. § 5 (the limitations are as follows: governor, $1 per vote in the last
gubernatorial election; all other statewide officials are limited to spending 50 cents per
voter in the last gubernatorial election).
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Although S.B. 655 does not fund candidates for the state legislature, it does
allocate a certain amount of funding to state political parties.2 4
1I. CONCLUSION
Missouri should adopt a system to finance publicly elections in the state
which, at a minimum, will dilute the influence of interest money at the
statewide level and, at a maximum, would have some effect all the way down
to the level of the local state legislator.
S.B. 474, introduced this year in the legislature, is a step in the right
direction. There are, however, difficulties. Missouri has experienced a tight
budget for several years and the costs of public financing are noteworthy.
These costs are compounded by Missouri's exceptionally large legislature.
Any program such as S.B. 474 which attempts to fund legislative elections as
well as statewide elections may incur considerable costs. On the other hand,
Minnesota has had a successful program for many years and has a legislature
larger than Missouri's.'25
S.B. 655 represents what is probably a cheaper and less effective method.
This method should be cheaper since it is only a matching fund provision.
On the other hand, the bill allows for higher spending limits during the
election than does S.B.474. It is, however, certainly less effective in reducing
or eliminating the role of interest money because, by definition, the level of
public funds as a portion of total campaign spending can never exceed fifty
percent. Also, the bill does nothing to change the situation in the legislature,
where the need for reform is most dire.
The General Assembly should also take steps to do whatever is necessary
to place the information flow in the legislature more firmly in public hands.
Accurate, unbiased information is critical to honest and competent lawmaking.
It is simply too important to risk leaving the flow of information in private
hands. Specifically, legislative committees should adopt written reports with
regard to their hearings and mark-up sessions in order to explain the nature of
interests involved in drafting a bill and to allow legislators to make up their
own mind.
Like the rest of us, private interests have every right to express their
views to the legislature and to our other elected officials. They have every
right to support candidates for public office. Economic power and the ability
to contribute large sums to political candidates, however, should not give these
interests superior rights or a superior voice when compared to other citizens.
As things currently stand in Missouri, the individual is outvoted by the
124. Id. § 4 (10% of the total funds are to be allocated to state political parties).
125. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, supra note 103, at 87 (Missouri has 197
legislators; Minnesota has 201).
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APPENDIX I
STATE STATUTES DEALING WITH CAMPAIGN FINANCE12
Alabama - ALA. CODE §§ 17-22A-1 to -22A-23 (1989) (The Fair
Campaign Practices Act; establishes campaign reporting and filing procedures,
outlaws corrupt election practices, and sets forth penalties for failing to meet
those restrictions).
Alabama - ALA. CODE § 40-18-146 (1989) (Public funding for political
parties. The law establishes a taxpayer surcharge of one dollar which allows
taxpayers to add one dollar to their liability and designate that it be contribut-
ed to a particular political party).
Alaska - ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.13.010-.13.130 (1989) (State Election
Campaigns law; creates an Alaska Public Offices Commission to oversee
campaign reporting activities; requires reporting contributions and expenditures
by candidates and committees).
Arizona - ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-901 to -924 (West 1989)
(Campaign Contributions and Expenditures law; sets out requirements for the
organization of a campaign committee; requires reporting of campaign
contributions in excess of $25.00 and all campaign expenses to the state
officer with whom the candidate had to file for office (that is, county clerk or
Secretary of State); prohibits contributions by corporations or labor unions
directly; sets limitations on the size of contributions which may be accepted
by candidates for various offices).
Arkansas - ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-6-201 to -214 (1989) (Campaign
Financing law; limits contributions by individuals, firms, unions, etc., to
$1,500.00 per election and to $2,500.00 per election for political parties;
prohibits cash and anonymous contributions only if in excess of $100.00;
provides for the filing of campaign finance reports with the Arkansas
Secretary of State; allows local candidates to file with the County Clerk).
California - CALIF. CODE ANN. § 84300 (West 1989) (Requires reporting
of campaign contributions and expenditures by any official seeking an office
which pays $100 or more per month; contribtions may be of any size with
certain limitations on cash contributions and contributions by government
employees; direct contributions by corporations and labor unions are
permitted; political parties are publicly funded through a tax surcharge and
matching funds from the state; taxpayers may choose a $1, $5, $10, or $25
126. For a detailed compilation of state campaign finance laws, see U.S. FEDERAL
ELECTION COMMISSION, CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAW '88 (1989).
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surcharge and may designate that the money go to any of several "qualified"
political parties).
Colorado - COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 1-45-101 to -45-121 (1989) (Campaign
Reform Act of 1974; Requires reporting of campaign contributions and
expenditures to the secretary of state or the county clerk or recorder; places
certain restrictions on the expenditure of campaign funds).
Connecticut - CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-333 to -347 (1989)
(Campaign Financing law; requires reporting of campaign expenditures and
contributions with the secretary of state or with the town clerk; sets regula-
tions for the establishment of political campaign committees and for their
expenditures; prohibits direct contributions to political campaigns by business
entities and places limits on the size of contributions by political committees
organized by a business entity; regulates advertising methods and prohibits
certain corrupt campaign practices).
Delaware - DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 8001-8013 (1989) (Campaign
Financing and Disclosure Act; Requires reporting to the State Election
Commissioner of membership, contributions and expenditures by political
committees).
Florida - FLA. STAT. ANN. § 106.08 (1989) (Requires reporting by
candidates, independent committees, political parties and persons making
independent expenditures of $100 or more; places $3,000, $2,000, $1,000
limitations on contributions to statewide, judicial, and all other candidates
respectively, and places a $100 limit on cash contributions; prohibits the
personal use of excess campaign funds following an election and provides for
certain sanctioned uses of those funds following an election; public funding
of candidates for governor and lieutenant governor is provided by direct
appropriation from the state legislature-no income tax checkoff or surcharge;
candidates for governor and lieutenant governor who accept public funds may
expend no more than 75 cents multiplied by the number of votes in the last
contested election for governor and lieutenant governor).
Georgia - GA. CODE ANN. §§ 40-3801 to -3820 (Michie 1989) (Ethics
in Government Act; creates a State Ethics Commission empowered to collect
campaign reporting data and to investigate and prosecute alleged violations of
the Act; sets forth specific requirements for the reporting of such data by
campaign committees).
Hawaii - HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 11-191 to -227 (1989) (Elections law;
creates a Campaign Spending.Commission, appoints the lieutenant governor
as the chief election officer of the state and divides responsibilities between
the two; sets forth the general requirements for the filing of campaign finance
reports by committees and candidates; regulates the number of fundraisers
which a candidate may hold prior to the election and requires advance
reporting of intent to hold a fundraiser; exempts certain fundraiser expenses
from being counted as campaign expenditures; limits contributions by persons
or entities other than political parties to an aggregate of $2,000.00 per
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election; allows a candidate to voluntarily limit campaign expenditures to
specified amounts based on the office sought and the number of voters at the
last election). HAW. REv. STAT. § 11-217 (1989) (Creates a Hawaii Election
Campaign Fund with revenues derived from an income tax checkoff; allows
public funding of candidates for governor, lieutenant governor and mayor at
the rate of one-fifth of the expenditure limit for that office; allows funding for
lesser local offices but stipulates that such funding not exceed $100.00).
Idaho - IDAHO CODE §§ 67-6601 to -6628 (1989) (Election Campaign
Contributions and Expenditures law; passed by initiative process at general
election on November 5, 1974; requires appointment of a campaign treasurer
and provides for that treasurer to make reports of contributions in excess of
$50.00 and expenditures in excess of $25.00 to the Secretary of State; also
requires reporting by lobbyists); IDAHO CODE § 35-2503(a)-(c) (1989) (Creates
a one dollar income tax checkoff to fund political parties; taxpayers may
designate which party is to receive the funds and where no designation is
made the funds accrue to a general campaign fund account; parties receive all
designated funds and a portion of the general fund which is distributed
according to number of votes received by that party at the last gubernatorial
election).
Illinois - ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46 paras. 9-1 to -27 (Smith-Hurd 1989)
(Disclosure of Campaign Contributions and Expenditures law; requires
reporting of each contribution in excess of $20.00 and proof of payment for
all expenditures in excess of $20.00; annual reporting to the State Board of
Elections and in certain cases to the county clerk is required; complaints
regarding alleged violations may be filed with the Board of Elections).
Indiana - IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-9-2-1 to -2-10 (Burns 1989) (Campaign
Contributions law; Specifically allows corporations and labor unions to
contribute directly to election campaigns; however, limits those contributions
to an aggregate of five thousand dollars per year for candidates for statewide
office-other limits apply for different offices). IND. CODE ANN. §§ 3-9-4-1
to -6-5 (Burns 1989) (Campaign reporting law; requires reports by candidates
and political committees to the state election board on an annual basis; sets
forth time and method of reporting for various committees). IND. CODE ANN.
§ 9-7-5.5-8(a) (1989) (This rather unusual statute allows for the public funding
of political parties in Indiana by means of revenues garnered by the state
through the sale of personalized vehicle license plates. These funds are
distribut6d equally to all political parties in Indiana which received at least
five percent of the total vote of the state in the last general election for
governor).
Iowa - IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 56.1-.30 (West 1989) (Campaign Disclosure
Income Tax Checkoff Act; creates a campaign finance disclosure commission
for receipt of reports and disbursement of public financing; generally requires
reporting of all contributions received which are in excess of $25.00, however,
larger contributions are allowed in campaigns for certain offices; allows any
(Vol. 55
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person who has a state income tax liability in excess of $1.50 to direct that
$1.50 be paid into the Iowa election campaign fund by method of an income
tax checkoff; any candidate for public office may apply to the Iowa election
campaign fund for public funding but that funding is funneled through the
state central committee of the candidate's political party which shall have
discretion in the amount awarded; use of the public funds in a primary
election is prohibited).
Kansas - KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-41 (1989) (Requires reporting of all
contributions and expenditures by candidates, political committees, party
committees, and persons making independent expenditures; contributions and
expenditures over $50 must be itemized; contributions are limited to $3,000
per statewide candidate per election and $750 per candidate for election to
state house and senate seats; the same limitations apply to direct contributions
by corporations and labor unions).
Kentucky - KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 121.010-.310 (Baldwin 1989)
(Campaign Finance Regulation law; creates an independent agency known as
the Kentucky Registry of Election Finance to accept reports and to enforce the
campaign reporting laws; allows persons to act make "independent expendi-
tures" on behalf of the election of a candidate but requires reporting of such
expenditures in excess of $100.00 made by any such individual; limits
contributions to candidates to $3,000.00 in any one election; requires reporting
by all candidates and committees of any contributions in excess of $100.00;
prohibits direct contributions by corporations). KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
121.230 (1989) (Public funding of political parties established through $2.00
income tax checkoff; taxpayers may designate which party shall receive the
funds; fifty cents of each designation is appropriated to the local political
committee of the party designated in the taxpayers home county; the
remaining $1.50 goes to the maintenance of the state party headquarters).
Louisiana - LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18:1481-:1532 (West 1989)
(Campaign Finance Disclosure Act; requires registration and regular reporting
by political and candidate committees; places limits for contributions which
vary according to the office sought).
Maine - ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1001-1020 (1989) (Cam-
paign Reports and Finances; placed limits on contributions and requires
reporting of contributions and expenditures). ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 36,
§ 5283 (1989) (Allows for public funding of political parties by allowing
taxpayers who are entitled to tax refunds to designate that $1, $5, $10 or
another amount be taken from the refund and given to a political party
designated by the taxpayer. Taxpayers who do not receive refunds may add
to their tax liability for the same purpose).
Maryland - MD. ELECTION CODE ANN. § 26-8 (1989) (Requires
reporting by all candidates who receive contributions in excess of $300 and
all political committees, parties and slates of all campaign contributions and
expenditures; contributions are limited to a maximum of $2,500 per election
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and $1,000 per candidate per election; same limitations apply to corporations
and labor unions; publicly-financed candidates for governor/lieutenant
governor are limited to expenditures not in excess of 20 cents per qualified
voter). MD. ELECnION CODE ANN. § 31-3 (1989) (Provides for a publicly-
financed campaign for the ticket of governor and lieutenant governor in 1990;
the funds are directly appropriated and there is no income tax checkoff or
surcharge; the system is a matching funds system-the state funds 50% of the
campaign for governor/It, governor in both the primary and general elections;
to be eligible to receive matching funds, candidates must raise 15% of the
expenditure limit (see above) for the race in private donations of $250 or less).
Massachusetts - MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 55A §§ 1-12 (West 1989)
(Limited Public Financing of Campaigns for Statewide Elective Office; creates
a state campaign finance election fund which publicly finances statewide races
for Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney General, Secretary, Treasurer and
Receiver General, and Auditor; applies to primary elections as well as to
general elections; requires candidates to file a bond before they are allowed
to receive public financing).
Michigan - MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 169.201-.282 (West 1989)
(Michigan Campaign Finance Act; limits cash contributions to $20.00 and
cash expenditures to $50.00 and outlaws anonymous contributions; prohibits
contributions from corporations; creates a state campaign fund with revenues
from a $2.00 income tax checkoff; candidates are entitled to receive $2.00 in
public financing for every $1.00 received in contributions once they have
received five percent of their spending limit in regular contributions).
Minnesota - MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10A.30-.34 (West 1989) (Campaign
Financing law; Provides for a broad system of public finance for campaigns
for statewide offices as well as campaigns for the state legislature; funded
through a $5 income tax checkoff provision; distributed to individual
candidates, independent candidates and to political parties if designated by the
taxpayer according to a formula which also allows for the return of campaign
funds to the areas from which they were collected as taxes). MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 10A.01 (West 1989) (Fair Campaign Practices law; Requires reporting
of all contributions and expenditures by candidates, party and political
committees and persons making independent expenditures in excess of $100;
provides for large contribution limits ranging from $60,000 in an election year
for candidates for governor/It, governor to $750 in an election year for
candidates for state representative; places limitations on spending by
candidates with amounts varying according to office and ranging from
$600,000 per election for governor/It, governor to $3,750 per election for state
representative candidates).
Mississippi - MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 23-15-801 to -813 (1989) (Requires
itemization and reporting of all contributions and expenditures which exceed
$500 for statewide officials and $200 for local offices by candidates and
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political committees; limits contributions by corporations, banks, and savings
and loan associations to $1,000 per candidate per election).
Montana - MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 13-37-101 to -37-308 (1989) (Control
of Campaign Practices and The Public Campaign Fund Act; creates a
commissioner of campaign practices to monitor campaign activity; requires
reporting by campaigns and political committees; places limits on contribu-
tions; provides for public financing of campaigns funded by taxpayer donation
through a one dollar surcharge; acceptance of public funding is voluntary and
limited to certain statewide races).
Nebraska - NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 49-1401 to -14,139 (1989) (Nebraska
Political Accountability and Disclosure Act; broad act dealing with campaign
finance reporting, conflict of interest limitations, lobbying and general
campaign practices; requires periodic filing regarding contributions and
expenditure).
Nevada - NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 294A.002-.080 (Michie 1989)
(Campaign Practices law; requires all candidates for office in Nevada to file
regular reports with the secretary of state detailing the source of their
contributions and listing expenditures).
New Hampshire - N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 664:1-:22 (1989) (Requires
the registration of all political committees; prohibits contributions from
corporations, partnerships, labor unions; places a $5,000.00 limitation on
contributions by individuals; provides for regular reporting by committees of
all receipts which exceed $25.00 and all expenditures).
New Jersey - N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:44A-1 to -44 (West 1989)
(Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act; creates a
commission to oversee campaign conduct in New Jersey; provides for regular
reporting by political committees of contributions and expenditures; provides
for the public financing of gubernatorial campaigns; funding comes from a
combination of a one dollar income tax checkoff and direct appropriations
from state funds).
New Mexico - N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19-25 to -37 (1989) (Campaign
Reporting Act; sets forth regular reporting procedures for candidates and
political committees who expect to receive contributions in excess of $500;
places no limitations on contributions).
New York - N.Y. ELECr. LAW §§ 14-100 to -128 (McKinney 1988)
(Campaign receipts and expenditures regulation; requires regular reporting of
all campaign contributions and expenditures; limits aggregate contributions to
$150,000 per calendar year by individuals; limits aggregate contributions by
corporations to $5,000 per calendar year; no limits on labor unions contribu-
tions).
North Carolina - N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.6 to -278.401 (1989)
(Campaign reporting act; requires reporting of political contributions and
expenditures; places certain dollar limits on political contributions). N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 163-278.41 to -278.45 (1989) (Public Financing law; creates
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the North Carolina Election Campaign Fund; allows chairmen of the state
central committees of parties to obtain funds from the Election Campaign
Fund and sets certain requirements for the manner in which the parties
disburse those funds; requires each state party to make an annual report
regarding the expenditure-of such public funds).
North Dakota -N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16.1-08-01 to -04 (1989) (Prohibits
direct contributions to campaigns from corporations, cooperative corporations,
and associations; requires reporting by candidates as to all contributions in
excess of $100.00).
Ohio - OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 3517.08 (1989) (Campaign Expendi-
tures; requires a statement of contributions and expenditures to be filed by
campaign committees, PACs, and political parties). OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
* §§ 3517.16-.18 (1989) (Public funds are divided equally among "major
parties" from a fund created by a one dollar income tax checkoff; parties are
required to allocate one half of the funds to the state party organization and
one half to local party organizations).
Oklahoma - OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, §§ 4200-4248 (West 1989)
(Oklahoma Ethics Commission Act; creates the Oklahoma Ethics Commission
which is given broad authority to monitor campaign and lobbying activities;
prohibits corporate contributions and requires regular reporting by candidates
and political committees; limits individual contributions to $5,000.00; allows
contributors to take a deduction from their state income tax liability of the
amount of their contribution so long as the amount deducted does not exceed
$100.00).
Oregon - OR. REV. STAT. §§ 260.005-.995 (1989) (Campaign Finance
Regulations; requires regular reporting of contributions and expenditures by
campaign committees and other political committees; provides for a political
contribution income tax checkoff with the revenues to be given to the state
central committees of the political parties; provides various enforcement
mechanisms).
Pennsylvania - 25 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3241-3260b (Purdon 1989)
(Elections law; requires reporting to the Secretary of the Commonwealth by
all committees which receive over $250.00 in contributions; all contributions
in excess of $50.00 must be: reported and all expenditures; allows exception
for candidates who file an affidavit stating they do not intend to raise and
spend over $250.00; prohibits contributions from national or state banks or
corporations).
Rhode Island - R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 17-25-1 to -29 (1989) (Rhode Island
Campaign Contributions and Expenditures Reporting Act; requires reporting
of all contributions received which are in excess of $200.00; limits contribu-
tions to $2,000.00 per calender year; allows for public financing for candidates
for governor of Rhode Island through a matching funds system-state
contributions will follow private contributions on a one-to-one basis; the
campaign fund is generated by an income tax credit [see R.I. GEN. LAWS §
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44-30-2(e) (1989)]; appropriations from the state's general fund are authorized
should the tax credit fail to generate sufficient funds).
South Carolina - S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-13-10 to -13-140 (Law. Co-op
1989) (Requires reporting of contribution and expenditure information and
itemization of contributions in excess of $100 by candidates, committees or
political parties).
South Dakota - S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 12-25-1 to -34 (1989)
(Campaign Financing; makes contribution of more than $1,000.00 to a
statewide candidate's political fund a misdemeanor; likewise limits contribu-
tions to candidates for the assembly or for county offices to $250.00;
$3,000.00 is the maximum contribution to a political party; requires reporting
of contributions and expenditures by most candidates ten days prior to election
day).
Tennessee - TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-10-101 to -10-111 (1989) (Cam-
paign Financial Disclosure Act of 1980; requires periodic filing of a campaign
report by all candidates and political committees detailing receipts and
expenditures). TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-10-201 to -10-209 (1989) (Establishes
the Tennessee Registry of Election Finance; the registry is given power to
administer the campaign disclosure act and to promulgate rules, make
investigations and issue opinions with regard to it).
Texas - TEx. ELECr. CODE ANN. §§ 251.001-.019 (Vernon 1989)
(Political Funds and Campaigns; prohibits members of the Texas legislature
and state officials from accepting campaign contributions while the legislature
is in session; prohibits contributions by corporations and labor unions except
where made to support or defeat a ballot measure; requires periodic reporting
of all contributions received in excess of $50.00 and all expenditures in excess
of $50.00; contains other provisions regarding campaign reporting and relating
to the conduct of political campaigns).
Utah - UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-14a-1 to -6 (1989) (Political Action
Disclosure Act; requires PACs to file with the -lieutenant governor and to
report all contributions in excess of $150.00; requires similar reports from
corporations who make contributions). UTAH CODE ANN. § 59-10-547 (1989)
(Creates a public election campaign fund from the proceeds of sales and use
taxes transferred from the general tax fund according to the number of income
tax payers who mark a tax checkoff block on their income tax return; the tax
return also provides a way for taxpayers to indicate which "qualified" political
party they wish to contribute to).
Vermont - VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 2801-2832 (1989) (Requires
reporting of all contributions received which exceed $50.00, the aggregate of
all contributions received which are less than $50.00, and all expenditures;
limits contributions to candidates and committees from individuals to
$1,000.00 and contributions from committees to $5,000.00).
Virginia - VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.1-251 to -263 (1989) (Fair Election
Practices Act; requires reporting of all contributions in excess of $100.00 and
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of all expenditures). VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-346 (1989) (Allows all taxpayers
eligible to receive an income tax refund to designate that two dollars of his
or her refund be paid to the state central committee of the political party of
his or her choice-in short, an income tax surcharge funds the parties).
Washington - WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 42.17.010-.135 (1989)
(Requires reporting all contributions in excess of $25.00 and of all expendi-
tures; special provision allowed for proceeds of qualifying political fundrais-
ers).
West Virginia - W. VA. CODE §§ 3-8-1 to -133 (1989) (Regulation and
Control of Elections; requires reporting of contributions and expenditures;
prohibits corporate contributions in most circumstances; limits individual and
labor union contributions to $1,000 per candidate per election).
Wisconsin - WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 11.001-.67 (West 1989) (Campaign
Financing law; requires registration of political committees and periodic
reports detailing all contributions received in excess of $20.00 and showing
all expenditures; creates the Wisconsin Election Campaign Fund and
authorizes candidates for statewide executive and judicial and state legislative
office to participate in the fund; the funds accrue from a one dollar income tax
checkoff and are distributed to any eligible candidate according to a formula).
Wyoming - WYo. STAT. §§ 22-25-101 to -115 (1989) (Campaign
Practices law; limits contributions to candidates by individuals to $1,000.00
in a two-year period; also limits total contributions by an individual of a
political nature to $25,000.00; requires candidates to file a statement of
receipts and expenditures within ten days following the primary or general
election; prohibits corporate contributions).
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